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Abstract—Advances in the field of Machine Learning and
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) has enabled rapid development
of sophisticated and autonomous systems. However, the inherent
complexity to rigorously assure the safe operation of such systems
hinders their real-world adoption in safety-critical domains such
as aerospace and medical devices. Hence, there is a surge in
interest to explore the use of advanced mathematical techniques
such as formal methods to address this challenge. In fact, the
initial results of such efforts are promising. Along these lines,
we propose the use of quantifier elimination (QE) — a formal
method technique, as a complimentary technique to the state-
of-the-art static analysis and verification procedures. Using an
airborne collision avoidance DNN as a case example, we illustrate
the use of QE to formulate the precise range forward propagation
through a network as well as analyze its robustness. We discuss
the initial results of this ongoing work and explore the future
possibilities of extending this approach and/or integrating it with
other approaches to perform advanced safety assurance of DNNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there is a tremendous surge of interest within
the aerospace community to leverage advances in Machine
Learning (ML) to develop sophisticated software for large,
autonomous avionic systems such as unmanned aircrafts. In
fact, the inherent ability of the modern structurally complex
computing systems such as Deep Neural Networks (DNN),
that automatically learn and generalize behaviors based on a
set of training data rather than explicit programming based
on requirements, makes it a natural choice for developing
autonomous components for aircraft. However, there is a wide-
spread apprehension about deploying such systems in the real-
world since it has not been possible to rigorously interpret
and assure the safe functional boundaries and behaviors of
the DNNs due to their structural complexity and behavioural
immensity [1, 2, 3]. For instance, analyzing the robustness
of DNNs against adversarial attacks [4, 5, 6] — small
perturbations to inputs that lead to unsafe outputs, remains
as an open safety assurance concern.
The use of mathematical techniques such as formal methods
has been recently demonstrated as a promising direction
towards addressing this challenge. Several formal approaches
have been proposed so far to measure DNN’s robustness
and resilience against adversarial inputs. Namely, recent ap-
proaches such as Reluplex [7, 8, 9] have used linear pro-
gramming (LP) and satsifiability modulo theory (SMT) solvers
to verify adversarial robustness of DNNs that use piece-
wise linear activation function such as Rectified Linear Units
(ReLU). Further, DeepSafe [10] studies the safe boundaries
of adversarial robustness guided by data, relying on clustering
to identify well-defined geometric regions as candidate safe
regions. Then it leverages Reluplex verification results for
confirmation. Another distinctive approach in the area, Relu-
Val [11], combines the search for concrete counterexamples
with layer-by-layer reachability analysis of the DNN. This
approach uses interval arithmetic to symbolically compute the
range bounds on the intermediate nodes and outputs of the
DNN. This has allowed ReluVal to verify a class of DNN
properties approximately 200× faster than Reluplex [11].
However, the underlying algorithm of ReluVal computes the
over-approximation of the ranges of nodes in a DNN that,
unfortunately, has not been shown to be able to assess the
adversarial robustness of the DNN.
In this paper, we propose a quantifier elimination (QE)
based static analysis of DNNs with ReLU activation, as a com-
plimentary technique to the state-of-the-art DNN verification
procedures. QE is a powerful formal technique for gaining
insight into problems involving complex logic expressions. In
the recent past, QE has effectively been used to derive the
strongest system property from components properties in the
compositional verification of traditional systems [12, 13].
Envisioning a DNN as a system composed of layers of con-
nected functional nodes, our idea is to formulate the problem
of precise range computation of DNN as a QE problem and
leverage QE solvers such as Redlog [14] to derive the range. In
addition to property verification, the QE-based analysis allows
derivation of precise regions in the input space of a DNN for
a desired output robustness measure. We adopt the forward
range propagation approach, that has also been used for layer-
by-layer reachability analysis in ReluVal, to detect linear-
behavioral neurons in each layer for simplification of onward
computation. The advantage of using QE (over approaches
such as ReluVal) is that QE can compute the precise range
at the existence of piece-wise linear behavioral neurons, i.e.,
non-convex scenarios.
As a proof-of-concept, we developed a prototype implemen-
tation and evaluated our approach using pre-trained DNNs of
next-generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System for un-
manned aircraft (ACAS Xu networks) [15] as a case example.
To cope with scalability issues we encountered when running
the experiments, we used several heuristics and fine-tuning
techniques, that we discuss later in the paper. Since ACAS
Xu networks have been benchmarks for evaluation of existing
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formal DNN analysis approaches, in addition to presenting
our tests results, we also discuss performance comparison and
potentials of methods integration with other tools.
In summary, the contributions of our work are:
• QE-based approach for forward range propagation in a
DNN.
• Initial results of our proof-of-concept implementation and
evaluation using ACAS Xu networks.
• Commentary on future works of finer-grained implemen-
tation for performance elevation.
• Commentary on the implications of using QE-based anal-
ysis as a complimentary technique to address some of the
open assurance-related challenges with DNNs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives
the brief background of DNN and related work on current ver-
ification progress, and the concept of QE. Section III describes
our forward range propagation and verification approach
built upon QE formulation of range computation. Section IV
presents our prototype implementation and initial test results.
Section V concludes this paper and envisions the potential
performance improvement and future work of integrating QE
with other formal network verification approaches.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
A. Deep Neural Network
A typical feed-forward deep neural network is a layered
structure of connected nodes called neurons, where each
neuron refines and extracts information from values com-
puted by neurons in the previous layer. An N -layer neural
network, as shown in Figure 1, maps the input vector ~x
to output(s) ~y, through a composed function ~y = f(~x) :=
fN (fN−1(. . . f2(f1(~x)) . . . )), where fk∈[1,N ] denotes the
feed-forward computation by the kth layer. Typically, fk
consists of a linear transformation (defined by a weight matrix
and a bias vector) of the output values of fk−1 (f0(~x) = ~x for
the network input layer), and a non-linear activation function
to the weighted sum. In this paper, we will consider DNNs
with piece-wise linear ReLU-activation function (ReLU(x) =
max(0, x) element-wise).
Fig. 1: N-layer Neural Network
B. Network Verification
DNNs are trained on finite data and are then expected to
generalize well to previously-unseen inputs, that are similar
to the training data. This similarity is loosely defined and
hence is met in many domains. However, in safety-critical
systems it is desirable, and sometimes mandatory, that it is
rigorously assured that certain properties hold irrespective of
any input. While the structural complexity of DNNs prevents
mathematical interpretation of the DNN’s behaviours, it is
well-known that testing is insufficient to conclude the non-
existence of inputs leading to erroneous results. Hence, there is
a strong need to explore alternate means of analysis procedures
such as formal methods that have being extensively used in
traditional systems.
Traditionally, formal methods are used to rigorously verify
if a desired formalized property holds in a mathematical model
of the system. In this paper, we consider the problem of
checking whether input-output relationships of a DNN (the
mathematical model) hold under a set of input constraints
Cinput. The expected output behavior is also described by a
set of output constraints Coutput. Verification problem requires
showing that the following assertion holds:(∧
Cinput ∧ Encodingnet
)⇒∧Coutput,
where Encodingnet is the encoding of inherent constraints
of a particular DNN. Typically, Encodingnet can be the
conjunction of constraints from every neuron, including the
linear constraint from the weighted sum function and the
piece-wise linear constraint from the ReLU activation function,
as exemplified in [16].
One class of the desired input-output properties of DNNs is
robustness against adversarial attacks, i.e., that small input per-
turbations cause major deviations (such as mis-classification)
in the networks output. A DNN’s mis-classification lacks
precise mathematical definition, since the ground truth can
be subjective. For example, image mis-classification (outside
the training data set) is often considered as inconsistency
with human eye classification. Human eye, although being
close to, rarely qualifies to provide the ground truth. However,
adversarial attacks often practically explore and exploit the un-
smoothness of a trained network, to carefully craft adversarial
inputs. It is due to the fact that DNNs are trained over a finite
set of data and are therefore unable to generalize over the
entire input space. Dually, a DNN may be retrained to increase
its robustness by improving its smoothness [17]. Before we
dive into verification, we introduce two common definitions
of adversarial robustness below. For a DNN (a classifier) with
n neurons at the output layer, each output neuron corresponds
to an output label l ∈ {l1, . . . , ln}. The output label of an
input sample ~x, denoted by L(~x), is decided based on the
comparison among the output neurons’ values. For example,
one can specify L(~x) = li iff li > lj ,∀j∈[1,n],j 6=i.
Definition 1. A DNN is δ-locally-robust at point ~x0 iff
∀~x, ||~x− ~x0|| ≤ δ ⇒ L(~x) = L(~x0).
Def. 1 [7, 16, 18] requires that the DNN assigns the same
label to two input points close enough to each other. Note
that, this definition is meaningful only when measured locally
regarding the proper choice of the reference point ~x0, since
the only type of DNN that satisfies this property globally will
naively output the same label for all its inputs (the distance
between any two finite input points can be partitioned into
finite number of δ segments). On the other hand, since the
DNN classification lacks global ground truth, it is impractical
to force a DNN to output the same label within the δ-
neighbourhood of ~x0. Therefore, we also consider another
definition of DNN robustness that is more inherent to the
expected behavior of a DNN itself as follows.
Definition 2. A DNN is (δ, )-locally-robust at point ~x0 iff
∀~x, ||~x− ~x0|| ≤ δ ⇒ ∀f∈{f1,...,fn}, ||f(~x)− f(~x0)|| ≤ ,
where fi∈{1,...,n}(~x) denotes the output value of the i-th output
neuron given input ~x.
Def. 2 [8] addresses the smoothness of the input-output
functions locally around a reference input ~x0. Meanwhile, it
is also expected to hold for arbitrary reference input ~x0 for
some  (although it is still practically hard to be verified at
the global scale even with the state-of-the-art tools).
C. Existing Approaches
There are usually two directions to approach a verification
problem: to falsify a property or prove it. It is sufficient to
find one counterexample to falsify a property. Some methods
implement searching algorithms for counterexample(s). For
example, in convex optimization simplex is an efficient algo-
rithm that moves from one vertex to another along the edges
in search for the optimal solution. Reaching one vertex that
violates the property leads to algorithm termination along with
the vertex identified as a concrete counterexample. In DNNs,
the ReLU activation function renders the constraint set non-
convex. To address such non-convex optimization problem,
Reluplex uses a modified simplex algorithm aided by LP
and SMT solvers. During the search, Reluplex either finds
a concrete counterexample or concludes that there is none.
On the other hand, proving a property requires to conclude
the DNN’s behaviors, often realized by reachability analysis
that computes the bounds on the values of the (output)
neurons. For example, ReluVal uses interval arithmetic to
perform forward symbolic interval propagation layer-by-layer.
The resulting bounds are near-precise, due to the fact that
over-approximation has to be used to “concretize” the range
of “active” (branching) neurons for the propagation onward,
losing its correlation with other neurons within the same layer.
It is hard to compare efficiency among verification algo-
rithms just based on the worst-case complexity for two main
reasons. Firstly, algorithms aiming for value bounds need to
traverse the entire input space for conclusion, regardless of
what the property is, whereas when the property is indeed
false, falsifying algorithms may terminate at the early stages
of the search if they happen to find a counterexample soon.
Secondly, the value bounds on neurons, once computed, can
be reused for a group of static analysis of the same input
constraints. Reusable information shared across verification
problems could be a major factor towards scalability enhance-
ment. Therefore, we believe that, just like the training of a
DNN usually involves a lot of experimenting and parameter
tuning, the verification problems should also be addressed in
a broad framework integrating a rich set of approaches and
formal methods tools. For a more recent and comprehensive
survey of existing algorithms for verifying DNNs, readers can
refer to [19]. To add to that effort, we propose a quantifier
elimination (QE) based range propagation method, in the
following section, as a complimentary formal method to state-
of-the-art verification approaches.
III. QE-BASED APPROACH
A. Quantifier Elimination
Quantifier elimination (QE) is a powerful technique for
gaining insight, through simplification, into problems involv-
ing logic expressions in various theories. A theory admits
quantifier elimination if and only if for every quantified
formula α in that theory, there exists another quantifier-free
formula αQF that is logically equivalent to it. For example,
in the domain of real numbers, ∃x(y > x2) is logically
equivalent to y > 0 (since x2 is always positive). QE is
the procedure of deriving an equivalent quantifier-free formula
from a quantified formula, as the former can be seen as the
residue of the later after the elimination of the quantifiers as
well as the quantified variables. In other words, QE can be
viewed as a dimensionality reduction method of quantified
dimensions. Since it has been proven by Tarski [20] that
the real closed field admits QE, it is suitable for solving the
problems of real-world applications.
Following the first implementable QE procedure in 1975 by
Collins [21], called the cylindrical algebraic decomposition
(CAD), the QE-based techniques and tools have undergone
tremendous enrichment over the past few decades and the ef-
forts made along the way have contributed to newer additions.
In particular, specialized procedures for restricted problem
classes led to newer, more advanced QE procedures, docu-
mented in tools such as Mathematica [22] and Redlog [14].
For example, Redlog implements virtual substitution [23] and
partial CAD [24] algorithms, that work for formulae where
the degrees of the quantified variables are small.
In our prior work, we have shown that the problem of SMT
is essentially an instance of QE. Simply put, checking the sat-
isfiability of a formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) of n-variables is equiv-
alent to checking whether or not ∃x1 . . . ∃xn φ(x1, . . . , xn)
can be reduced to true through a QE procedure, since all
variables are quantified thereby eliminated, the residue logical
formula without variable can only be Boolean value true or
false. Thus, in the SMT solving domain, the capabilities of
SMT solvers and QE solvers overlap in general, yet vary
depending on the algorithms they employ and the theories they
support. Intuitively, QE, as a more generalized mathematical
tool, provides a broad range of functionalities over SMT. For
example, while a SMT query returns a satisfying solution to a
set of constraints, QE query can apply existential quantifiers
on a set of arbitrarily selected variables and return a logical
formula regarding only the un-quantified variables revealing
the strongest relationship among them.
As part of our exploration of aforementioned distinguished
capabilities of QE, we established in [12], that QE serves
as a composition calculus, and applies to compositional ver-
ification, a technique being developed to cope with state-
space explosion in concurrent systems [25, 26]. Essentially
the strategy of divide-and-conquer is employed where one
first establishes the properties of the system components, and
then uses those to establish the overarching properties of
a complex system. Supposing a system is composed of N
components, the property contract of the ith component can
be expressed as Ai ⇒ Gi, where Ai (the “assumption”) and
Gi (the “guarantee”) are both expressed as 1st-order logic
formulae over the set of component variables. Then the set
of all the system behaviors is constrained by the conjunction
of all the components contracts,
∧N
i=1(Ai ⇒ Gi). Under
these components contracts, the “strongest system property”
that can be claimed by the system, can be obtained by
existentially quantifying the system’s internal variables in the
conjunct of component contracts with the constraints resulting
from the connectivity relation among the components. Thus
we established that QE serves as a foundation for property
contract composition. Then to check whether a system satisfies
a postulated property, we only need to check if the postulated
property is implied by the aforementioned strongest system
property. This itself can be cast as another QE problem.
B. QE-based DNN Range Propagation
We extend our idea of contract composition for deriving the
strongest system property to formulate the range computation
of a ReLU-DNN neuron into a QE problem. Consider a ReLU-
DNN of N layers with input ~x, output ~y, and label L. Let
Z be the set of intermediate weighted sum variables and A
be the set of the intermediate activation variables. Without
loss of generality, we present out approach over the range
computation of a single output variable y ∈ ~y. Because all the
output variables are structurally parallel and share the same
upstream N−1 layers, the same range computation technique
can be applied to each of them. Let the encoding of DNN
regarding to the particular output y (of all its related weighted
sum and activation constraints), Encodingnet, be expressed
as the conjunction of all the predicates over ~x, y, Z, and A.
Let C~x be the set of specified input constraints (ranges).
As discussed in the previous subsection, we can formulate
the strongest property of an output neuron y of a DNN as:
∃~x ∃Z ∃A
(∧
C~x ∧ Encodingnet
)
(1)
where ∃ over a vector (resp. set) denotes existentially quantify-
ing every element variable of the vector (resp. set). Note that,
(1) is the DNN interpretation of the strongest system property
formulation in [12]. Logically, since all the variables but y in
(1) are quantified, the quantifier-free equivalence of (1) is a
conjunction and/or disjunction of linear predicates over y only.
Proposition 1. (1) is the precise range property of y under
input range constraints C~x.
Proof. Let Rprecise(C~x, y) denote the actual precise range
property of y given C~x. Following Proposition 1 in [12], (1)
is a system property of the DNN, i.e., all y values of the DNN
under C~x must satisfy (1), then we have Rprecise(C~x, y) ⇒
(1). Meanwhile, (1) is the strongest system property, meaning
that it implies any other system property. We then also have
(1) ⇒ Rprecise(C~x, y). The mutual implication between (1)
and Rprecise(C~x, y) proves that they are in fact equivalent.
The formulation of (1) and Proposition 1 are the corner-
stones of our QE-based DNN range propagation approach.
However, Encodingnet contains a large size of variables and
constraints, especially the piece-wise linear constraints that
render the problem non-convex. The state-of-the art QE solvers
are insufficient to process it naively. In the rest of the section,
we briefly present a layer-by-layer forward range propagation
(a sequence of range computations, each of which has its own
formulation as in (1)) similar to ReluVal [11], along with a set
of heuristics on-the-fly to reduce the size of each individual
QE formulation, and eventually conclude the precise range of
y for a benchmark-scale network.
Basics of Forward Range Propagation. In our setting, each
hidden neuron is split into a weighted-sum node and an
activation node. We denote the output range (resp. value) of
the weight sum node as the z-range (resp. z-value), and the
output range (resp. value) of the activation node as the a-
range (resp. a-value). The forward range propagation starts
from the first hidden layer, where the z-range of each neuron
can be formulated similarly to (1) with the smallest sub-graph
encoding including only the input constraints and the weighted
sum node constraint. Since all neurons in the same layer
share the same upstream sub-graph, their z-ranges naturally
fit multi-threaded parallel computation. Theoretically, the time
cost for range propagation of an entire layer with n neurons
can be reduced to that of a single neuron by running n
threads in parallel. The a-range of a neuron can be trivially
computed from its z-range following the ReLU function. Such
computation steps are forward progressed layer-by-layer until
the ranges of the target output neurons are computed.
On-the-fly Pruning for Scalability. The scalability of the
precise range propagation largely depends the QE solver’s
performance on the encoding of the network. The classes
of local adversarial robustness properties verification have
relatively small input ranges (δ-neighborhood of a sample
point). In this premise, a majority of the hidden neurons
either behave purely linearly or even have a constant zero
output. The above forward propagation approach identifies
such neurons and simplifies the network behavioral structure
as much as possible. In our preliminary tests, we found that
the major factor causing our QE solver Redlog timeout, is
the number of disjunctive predicate clauses in the network
encoding. This corresponds to the number of branching neu-
rons remaining in the simplified network behavioral structure.
We observed that Redlog can handle a single neuron precise
range computation, with 6∼8 branching neurons distributed
across different upstream layers, in less than a few tens of
seconds. However, one more such neuron may suddenly leads
to more than 1,000 seconds execution time or even timeout.
The on-the-fly pruning (identifying and then simplifying) of
the linear part of the network behavioral structure results in
a much computationally affordable residual of the network.
Note that, the precise range computation of each neuron in
layer l requires the encoding of all its upstream sub-graph
of the behavioral structure rather than just the ranges of
neurons in layer l − 1. Failure to do so will lose tracking the
correlation among the neurons, thus introducing large over-
approximation errors similar to the naive interval propagation
noted by ReluVal in [11].
Over-approximation. Many verification problems allow over-
approximation as long as the property still holds with a
reasonable over-approximation precision. In network node
range computation, one can replace the set of constraints of
a branching neuron, i.e., constraints of both upstream and
its functionality, with only its propagated a-range to over-
approximate the downstream range computation. This effect is
known as the dependency problem [27] and is studied in [11]
in the network context. A new effect for our QE-based range
propagation is that the over-approximation may cause more
branching neurons downstream than there actually exists. We
propose a few techniques to fine-tune the trade-off between
computation efficiency and precision. The over-approximation
shall be used only for the branching neurons, since branching
behavior is the major hinder of QE solving. And/Or one
can over-approximate a subset of the branching neurons,
leaving a small number of branching neurons as is during the
propagation. Another way to reduce over-approximation errors
is input partition discussed separately below.
Input partition. With input partition (also adopted by ReluVal
in [11] in the form of input bisection), the overall range will be
the union of range from each input sub-space. Input partition
can significantly reduce the accumulated over-approximation
error. Meanwhile it suppresses the number of branching neu-
rons in each input sub-space, improving the scalability for both
precise and over-approximated forward range propagation.
Note that, input partition is highly parameterizable as the
partition can be done in one or more input dimensions, in
the form of bisection or more segments, and evenly or by
decision-boundary. One future research direction is to decide
the partition plan possibly depending on input sensitivity
analysis. Input partition is also highly parallelizable as the
sub-spaces can be checked independently.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND CASE STUDY
We have developed a proof-of-concept prototype imple-
mentation of our QE-based forward range propagation and
verification framework, with on-the-fly network pruning using
propagated neuron ranges. Partials of the proposed over-
approximation and input partition methods are used for pre-
liminary tests.
A. Experimental Set-up
Our prototype tool is implemented in Python with multi-
threaded parallel computation feature. We present our tests
results on the benchmark of pre-trained DNNs of a next-
generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System for un-
manned aircraft (ACAS Xu networks) open-sourced by the
original authors [7]. We adapted their custom neural network
format as per the requirements of our tool. As a first pass,
we set a hard threshold of 7200 seconds as our maximum
execution time before we declared the test “timeout (TO)”.
All experiments were run on 2 Intel Xeon Silver 4114 CPUs
with 40 logical cores and 32 GB memory. All experiments are
10-threaded.
B. Overview of ACAS Xu Networks
ACAS X is a family of aircraft collision avoidance systems,
which is currently under development by FAA and NASA
[28]. ACAS Xu system is the version for unmanned aircraft
control. It is intended to receive sensor information regarding
the drone (the ownship) and any nearby intruder drones, and
then issue horizontal turning advisories aimed at preventing
collisions. Each advisory is assigned a score, with the lowest
score corresponding to the best action. The input sensor data,
as illustrated in Figure 2, are:
• ρ: distance from ownship to intruder;
• θ: angle of intruder relative to ownship heading direction;
• ψ: heading angle of intruder relative to ownship heading
direction;
• vown: speed of ownship;
• vint: speed of intruder;
• τ : time until loss of vertical separation; and
• aprev: previous advisory.
Fig. 2: Geometry for ACAS Xu Horizontal Logic Table. Figure
taken from [7].
ACAS Xu networks [15] are the DNN re-implementation
of the ACAS Xu system, with the intention to reduce memory
constraint of the on-board avionics hardware [7, 29]. In one
of the recent versions, the input state space of the ACAS Xu
system is partitioned into 45 sub-spaces by the combination
of aprev (5 values) and discretized τ (9 values) [7]. A unique
DNN is trained for each sub-space with the remaining 5
inputs. The complete ACAS Xu networks contains an array
δ=0.005 δ=0.01 δ=0.025Tests on DNN: N1,1 result precise time result precise time result precise time
no 23 no 24 no 542P1: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0] COC yes TO UNKNOWN yes TO UNKNOWN yes TO
no 26 no 31 no 85P2: [0.2, -0.1, 0, -0.3, 0.4] COC yes 112 COC yes TO UNKNOWN yes TO
no 16 no 35 no 49P3: [0.45, -0.23, -0.4, 0.12, 0.33] COC yes 21 COC yes 75 COC yes TO
no 20 no 65 no 287P4: [-0.2, -0.25, -0.5, -0.3, -0.44] COC yes 35 COC yes TO UNKNOWN yes TO
no 22 no 40 no 143P5: [0.61, 0.36, 0.0, 0.0, -0.24] COC yes 75 COC yes TO UNKNOWN yes TO
Note: All sample points are in format [δ, θ, ψ, vown, vint]. All times are in seconds. “TO” denotes timeout. value in the “precise” column denotes if the
precise range is propagated or the over-approximation otherwise.
TABLE I: δ-local-robustness tests results.
of 45 such fully-connected DNNs, each of which (denoted as
Ni∈[1,5],j∈[1,9] ) has total 300 hidden neurons evenly distributed
in 6 hidden layers. Each hidden neuron consists of a linear
weighted sum function feeding to a ReLU activation function.
Recall that, in this paper, we denote the output range (resp.
value) of the weight sum node of a neuron as its z-range
(resp. z-value), and the output range (resp. value) of the
activation node as its a-range (resp. a-value). The output layer
of each DNN consists of five output neurons computing and
outputting only weighted sum of the a-values of neurons in
the previous layer, i.e, the output neurons do not possess
activation function. The five output neurons are denoted by
QCOC , QWL, QWR, QSL, and QSR respectively, one for each
of the five possible advisories: Clear-of-Conflict (COC), weak
left (WL), weak right (WR), strong left (SL), and strong
right (SR). An advisory is selected as the DNN output if the
corresponding output neuron has the minimal z-value.
C. Results
In this section, we first present our tests results regarding
local adversarial robustness defined by Def .1 in Section II-B.
Then, we introduce our new feature of precise quantitative
analysis of the local robustness region regarding Def. 2 in
Section II-B. Finally, we show from one test case that our
approach has the potential to be used for more general type
of DNN input-output property verification.
δ-Local-Robustness Tests: δ-local-robustness requires a δ-
neighborhood of a sample point agrees on the output label.
This is the human basis for identifying mis-classification. We
tested on one of the 45 networks, with the same 5 (normalized)
sample points by Reluplex [7] and 3 perturbation values on the
normalized inputs. After forward range propagation, one can
compare the range bounds on each output neuron to decide if
one of the labels always corresponds to the least value. Table. I
shows this verification results based naively on output ranges.
A few comments on the δ-local-robustness tests results and
possible actions for improvement are listed below:
• The precise range propagation can be achieved at a small
perturbation (δ = 0.005). Note that, the δ values are
perturbations on normalized values, their raw-sizes are
still large for reasoning about adversarial robustness.
• When δ increases to 0.01, most precise range propagation
causes timeout due to the increasing number of branching
neurons. But verification on 4 out 5 sample points can still
be completed conclusively using over-approximation.
• The verification result is “UNKNOWN” using naive
range comparison among output neurons when there is
overlapping on those ranges. Input partition (not yet used
for this group of tests) can be adopted to refine the range
bounds on input sub-space for decision, and/or the range
computation formulation can be augmented with extra
linear constraints of encoding the guarantee on the correct
label getting the minimum value.
• Our timeout threshold is relatively low of 7200 seconds.
Some of the “TOs” in Table. I actually get results back in
longer time. For example, precise forward range propa-
gation of P5 with δ = 0.01 on DNN N1,1 is completed in
16216 seconds. Since its computation time at δ = 0.005
(75 seconds) is drastically lower, it suggests that bisection
could improve the case. We will verify that in the near
future.
(δ, )-Local-Robustness Tests: (δ, )-local-robustness empha-
sizes the -smoothness in the continuous output space (instead
of discrete labels) within the δ-neighborhood of a sample
point. The key challenge here is to find the precise mapping
between the two parameters δ and  in dual directions. To the
best of our knowledge, our prototype is the first to achieve
such precise mappings at the presence of branching neurons.
Without loss of generality, we demonstrate our approach on
the COC output neuron only.
1) δ-to- precise mapping: This precise mapping is a natu-
ral result of our QE-based precise forward range propagation
given a small δ. For example, the precise range of the QCOC
output of DNN N1,1 with in the 0.01-neighborhood of P3
in Table I, is computed to be [−0.02158274,−0.02157095]
(rounded to the nearest 10−8). The largest absolute difference
from the sample output of P3 (−0.02157623) is the precise 
(=0.00000651).
2) -to-δ precise mapping: Narrowing down the δ for a
given  helps isolating adversarial ranges of inputs from the
non-adversarial ones. It allows a DNN developer to do so po-
tentially with a desired precision. Both Reluplex and ReluVal
use iterative bisections on the original δ to approach a better
precision. Our approach takes this to a further level, allowing
direct backward derivation of the precise input perturbation
for a desired .
Given ~x0 as the sample input and an original reference δ0,
we first perform precise forward range propagation to obtain
the corresponding 0 along with a simplified behavioral
structure. Then for a desired output deviation ∗ < 0, we
are able to formulate the derivation of the corresponding
precise input perturbation δ∗ using QE in a mutated version
of (1) with δ as integrated variable and all the other variables
properly quantified. After the QE procedure eliminates all
the quantifiers and the quantified variables, its quantifier-free
equivalence is a simple predicate with δ as the only remaining
variable. Taking again DNN N1,1 and P3 as an example, if
we pick the desired ∗ = 0.000003 (< 0.00000651), i.e.,
∗ is less than the deviation under the original δ0 = 0.01,
then δ ≤ 0.00460093247 is derived in a single step. Hence
the precise δ∗ is 0.00460093247. The time cost for this
computation is only 4.5 seconds.
Remark: Before the derivation of δ∗, a forward range prop-
agation with an original δ0 is necessary to obtain the much
simpler network behavioral structure. Otherwise QE solving
using the encoding of the entire network is too computational
costly to be tractable. Nevertheless, the forward range prop-
agation can be relaxed to allow over-approximation in some
cases. When the 0 computed from δ0 is an over-approximated
value, then the precise δ∗ derived from the desired ∗ < 0
is valid if and only if δ∗ ≤ δ0. Otherwise, the network is not
guaranteed to behave under the behavioral structure of δ0,
thus the derivation loses soundness.
A General Property Test. In addition to local robustness tests
presented above, we tested our prototype on one of the original
properties, namely, φ1 described in Reluplex paper [7]. φ1 has
a much larger input space comparing to all the local robustness
test cases, and it specifies that the COC output value never
exceeds 1500. Our prototype is still under refinement, we are
able to test φ1 on DNN N1,1, mainly to evaluate the potential
performance improvement with over-approximation and input
partition for verification problems. Using input bisection on all
five input dimensions, the union of the COC output range of all
32 sub-spaces is [−522.12258186, 1453.19412714] (rounded
to the nearest 10−8). Thus φ1 is proven to be valid. The
average time for each input sub-space range propagation is
82 seconds. If our prototype has similar performance on the
rest of the 45 ACAS Xu networks, and computation resources
allow parallel computation of all input sub-spaces, it will be a
drastic performance elevation (assumed 2,624 seconds on all
45 networks) comparing to Reluplex (>443,560.73 seconds)
and ReluVal (14,603.27 seconds).
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Conclusion. In the paper, we presented our contribution
towards bridging the gap between the advances in DNN
applications and the rigorous verification needs arising from
safety concerns, in the form of a prototype tool with a
proof-of-concept implementation. Our QE-based approach ap-
plies to ReLU-activated DNNs. The preliminary tests re-
sults are promising and show the potential of state-of-the-
art performance with further refined implementation of over-
approximation and input partition techniques. A unique feature
of our approach is that it is able to forward propagate the
neurons ranges precisely at the existence of a few branching
neurons, allowing a more fine-grained quantitative adversarial
analysis. A second unique feature is its ability to derive the
precise input perturbation from a desired output deviation,
assisting the DNN developer to isolate and avoid adversarial
ranges with a given precision.
Future Work. We plan to focus on 1) refining our over-
approximation and input partition algorithms, 2) customizing
QE algorithms/solvers to achieve better performance on the
classes of QE problems formulated in our approach, and 3)
conducting thorough tests to get a comprehensive evaluation
and comparison with state-of-the-art tools such as Reluplex
and ReluVal. We envision, in the long term, QE-based range
propagation can be integrated with other formal verification
procedures, to achieve more flexibility and efficiency on a
broader range of DNN formal analysis.
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